Before Liu Shengqi ( ) became the early PRC's foremost historian of Tibet, he was an English-language secretary in Lhasa for the Nationalist Government's Commission on Mongolia and Tibet. His travels and assessment of Han-Tibetan relations in and around Lhasa provide a unique perspective on Tibet's tenuous relationship with the Chinese central government from 1945 until 1949. With the 2010 publication of Liu's recollections in Lhasa (in Chinese), a new window is opened on the literature on Tibet's history --and assertions of Guomindang power in the region --in the period just preceding the traumatic collision with Maoism.
The historical question of Tibet's administrative and cultural linkage to China prior to October 1950 is a matter of ongoing dispute. As with other Tibetan historical topics which have garnered sustained attention from Beijing, the development of Chinese-language scholarship on this issue has reached a rather fecund status. ii Unsurprisingly, the immense financial resources which the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has poured into Tibetan history research have yielded a great deal of scholarly work which stresses a pattern of unremitting contact between the lamaist court in Lhasa and what is rather loosely called "the central government / ". iii The existence of this body of scholarship serves, in some ways, as a repository to be turned to in times of great stress. When claims of the legitimacy of Chinese authority over Tibet are questioned internationally -for instance, in the immediate aftermath of the Tibetan uprising of March 2008 --the CCP can confidently hoist up a simplified historical interpretation that "the Tibetans have always been a member of the Chinese family, and for 700 unbroken years since the Yuan dynasty, the Chinese central government has carried out effective governance over Tibet [ ]." iv More importantly, such statements render Tibet's absorption into the PRC in 1951 by the CCP as the restoration of a long-standing status quo. The CCP thus appears on the Tibetan scene as the smooth successor to thousands of years of dynastic history, not a group of radical atheists bent on the destruction of Tibet's sacred past. v Diehard foreigners and recalcitrant Tibetans who refuse to accept the CCP's legitimacy in Tibet, rejecting the Party's rhetoric and achievements in the areas of modernization and economic development, ought properly to be stunned into silence when confronted with the picture of seven hundred years of continuous central government rule over Lhasa. vi Since the uprising (or, depending on the rhetorical orthodoxy being employed, the "riot"/dongluan) in Lhasa of March 14, 2008, Party presses have been churning out a great deal of new information seeking to reinforce the CCP's claims to Tibet. (To date, Warren W. Smith appears to have made the most comprehensive summary and analysis of these materials.) Treatments of the "serf liberation" of 1959 have been particularly prominent, emphasizing and enumerating the evils of the Tibetan aristocracy prior to 1959 to the extent that the PRC retroactively declared March 11 "serf liberation day." vii In addition to the standard range of social science and religious research, these texts include historical treatments of the Tibetan aristocracy prior to 1951 along with healthy helpings of photos from the CCP archives in Tibet. viii Much more useful for mainstream historians are publications on the early 1950s. A new bilingual book about Zhang Jingwu, the CCP's earliest and most significant administrator in Tibet, describes events of the early and mid1950s in a way that seems very much in keeping with Party scholarship on similar developments in Xinjiang at the time. ix Melvyn Goldstein's immense and authoritative The Modern History of Tibet, Volume 1: The Demise of the Lamaist State (originally published in English in 1989) has been available in Chinese since 2001, but it has been reprinted and is now widely available, if potentially stripped of its most colourful description of the 13 th Dalai Lama's warnings about the evils of communism. x The appearance of these texts seems to be part of a larger effort to educate both foreigners and the Chinese public about Tibet, and to diffuse some new thinking or at least new sources about Tibetan history in the pre-1959 era. That these efforts have been redoubled in the aftermath of the March 2008 uprising in Lhasa now seems completely clear. Rather than sitting on its historical laurels and repeating the old slogans, the CCP has mobilized a wave of scholarship in the service of documenting and demonizing the old system while at the same time emphasizing the high respect with which Chinese bureaucrats from "the center" have always regarded Tibetans and Tibetan culture.
In these conditions, a conscious effort has been made by the CCP to revise the historical view of the Guomindang efforts in Tibet, making them no longer part and parcel of "foreign imperialism," but rather as part of the long sweep of Chinese power and influence exercised on the plateau. Seen benignly, this trend might be integrated into a broader societal and academic interest in the Republican era, as represented most attractively by the periodical Lao Zhaopian (Old Photographs). By the same token, the fecundity of the scholarship in terms of pure quantity is not to be confused with diversity of perspective.
One of the most interesting themes that has arisen in recent years in the official study of Tibetology and Chinese foreign policy histories in China has been the recuperation and rehabilitation of the Republican period. The CCP, in other words, is moving further away from the kind of previous Stunde Null interpretation of its own history where the Party's appearance in power swept away the past completely. In the case of Tibet, the CCP has encouraged research into the earlier linkages, not demonizing Jiang Jieshi (hereafter Chiang Kai-shek) but seeking to promote the view -ironically, almost identical to Chiang's at the time -that the various Guomindang missions to Tibet constituted, as one collection of documents indicates "Tibet's belonging to China." xi It is somewhat irrelevant that Mao himself never appeared to contextualize his own Tibet policy by citing Jiang's prior actions, and that he really only said he was going to clean Guomindang influence out of Tibetsuch as it was --in October 1950 when he wrote about China's justification for moving against resisting Tibetans in the vital eastern Tibetan crossroads city of Chamdo. xii What was inconvenient to mention in the 1960s has returned as a vital new pillar in the revised justification for Chinese central control over Tibet.
To government-affiliated historians today, Guomindang missions to Tibet indicate China's concern for developments on the plateau, and, when simplified into documentaries or with the appropriate pictures, can be used to demonstrate that Tibet was not absent Chinese influence during the Republican period. Among the examples raised most prominently were, in the wake of the warlord period and Tibetan-Chinese wars for control over Amdo in the early 1930s are the mission of Liu Manqing xiii , Huang Musong's August-November 1934 mission to mourn for the 12 th Dalai Lama xiv , and Shen Shulian's 1944 mission.
In January 2010, the Tibetology Publishing House put forth a collection of essays by Liu Shengqi in the form of short episodic memoirs. Liu had been stationed in Lhasa from 1944 to 1949 as the English-language Secretary for various (Guomindang) Central Government organs and later became one of the foremost Tibetologists in the early PRC. xv His lively biographical history which intersected with one of the major turning points in the modern history of the Tibetan plateau -the fall from power of the Nationalist Party in mainland China. He is therefore a figure of significance when attempting to unravel both what happened in Tibet at the end of the Chinese Republican era, but also in how Tibet's subsequent history was interpreted, as he himself was instrumental in crafting the distinctive CCP historiography on the Tibetan plateau. xvi Liu's own personal recollections do not contradict the basic fact that he was a low-level Nationalist official in Lhasa from 1944-1949, but they also remind us that much of the significant correspondence from Chongqing and then Nanking to Lhasa in those years passed through his hands. How Liu ended up on the 1944 mission is of some interest. Liu's early interest in Tibet was sparked by a visit by the Panchen Lama to Hangzhou in 1925. His early career had brought him to England and India. Perhaps in a later article I will be able to delve more into his early life, and his treatment of the Reting conspiracy in Lhasa in 1947, which he wrote about extensively in journalistic style for publication in Shanghai.
The following document dates from 1967, the height of the Cultural Revolution during which time traditional academics were under threat, often physically. xvii The context of the document is absent any annotation that it was a kind of personal confession. In the three years prior to the Cultural Revolution, Liu had grown interested in Lamaism, but his publication stream on the subject was truncated by the emergence of the political struggle in Beijing and nationwide.
Recollections of Liu Shengqi, 1967, Beijing
The Mongolia-Tibet Commission was established in early 1934. At that time the 13 th Dalai Lama had just passed away, and the Nationalist Government sent the head of the Commission, Huang Musong, to Lhasa both to serve as a mourner and to revive the relations between the Central government and the Tibet local government which had been broken off by the Xinghai Revolution. After that, the Nationalist government was increasingly active in Lhasa, where they set up a telegraph service (under the Transportation and Communication Ministry), the Lhasa Primary School (under the Education Ministry), the Lhasa Survey Office (I believe under the Weather Bureau), and other organizations.
The local Tibetan government acknowledged these organs of National Government. At the same time, the local Tibetan authorities were secretly cooperating with British imperialists, strictly controlling things, and would not let people from the [Chinese] interior come to Tibet; their control of Han people was particularly rigorous. However, since Tibet and the motherland shared a long tradition of relations, there was no way to totally stamp it out. So there were always people coming to Tibet secretly, and the authorities could do nothing about it. Some National governors disguised themselves as businessmen from Xining or Kang District, or pilgrims on their pilgrimage and sneaked into Tibet. But those were exceptions. Once they entered Tibet, the local authority would take it as a fact and wouldn't look into it. But taking things on the whole, the Tibet local authority kept considerable strict surveillance on the border and roads, and they kept the national government at arm's length. This is a simple way of describing the background at the time that we went to Tibet.
In 1944, the victory in the War of Resistance was in view, and Chiang Kai-shek sent Shen Zonglian to Tibet, in the hopes of planting a few seeds in the Tibet locality that with proper opportunities in the future would ripen and over time develop. The Tibetan local government, along with local warlords and not a few Tibetan hard-liners, was resisting the Nationalist Government in Qinghai, Gansu, Kangba, and other provinces; this was "forced integration."
The Nationalist Government hoped to take advantage of the coming victory in the War of Resistance and the decline in British power during the Second World War as an opportunity, on the one hand to establish high-level contacts with powerful monks in Tibet, and on the other hand to sound out the British attitude, in order to gain some political capital on the subject of the Tibet problem diplomatically.
Before Shen Zonglian (the head of the Commission) went to Tibet, Kong Qingzong, the head of the Office of Affairs in Lhasa, had made an enemy out of the local authorities and created a number of contradictions. He had alienated [the Tibetans] to the extent that both sides hardly had any communications since. Therefore once in Lhasa, Shen Zonglian tried to get back in touch with a lot of people by inviting people and sending out presents, and he tried hard to warm the relations between the two sides. The Tibetan elites also knew that Shen Zonglian had come from the head [of the Nationalist Government], and their attitude totally changed, thereafter improving relations. However, once it came to the essential issues of their discussion, things wouldn't work at all.
For example, after all the coastal areas fell to enemy occupation, the National Government wanted to use the name of the War of Resistance to get the Tibetans to agree to have a road built between India and Tibet, for the purpose of creating a communication line at the rear area to the outside. However once this idea was proposed, the local Tibetan government opposed the idea immediately and refused to change one bit, and the National government had to give up.
Again according to the later remarks of Chen Yangzhang (the secretary who in 1946 replaced Shen as head of the delegation), at the time when Shen Zonglian went to Lhasa, the Nationalist Government planned to set up a telegraph, primary schools and a survey office for him to manage. They also wanted him to communicate with and manage other Nationalist offices in Tibet, but this stance was opposed by some people, and it created a struggle within the Nationalist Government, and nothing came of it. This was the internal situation.
As for dealing with British Imperialism, before entering Tibet from India, Shen Zonglian went to New Delhi to talk to Sir Olaf Caroe, a minister for the British Government in India. According to what Shen said about this conversation afterwards, Caroe told him that Britain though that China's National Government and the local Tibetan government had a relationship based on so-called "religious sovereignty." After this Shen Zonglian went to meet with another head of British Imperialism who had invaded our Tibet, the British Government in India's Administrator in Sikkhim, Sir Basil Gould, to get his views. Gould expressed himself more straightforwardly, saying that negotiations should be based on the illegal Simila Conference, which was to say that the British Imperialist invasion attitude was not changed at all. Therefore the Nationalist Government had very little progress on the diplomatic front.
Shen Zonglian went to Tibet from the autumn of 1944, and he left in the spring of 1946; in this period of more or less one year, the important things that happened were: 1) He broke the deadlock between the local government and the Commission, and maintained good relations with a portion of the Tibetan elites; 2) He worked to connect with the monasteries, and stopped the British primary school which had just opened in Lhasa for Tibetan nobles, and got it to close; 3) In early 1946, when he went back to Chinese interior China to report, he got the Dalai Lama's older brother to go to the Chinese interior to study, but this resulted in the distancing of the Tibet local authority from the commission. Because of this, Shen did not come back to Lhasa, but he instead continued his work in the interior.
According to my analysis now, the most important activities of our office in Tibet were of this type: 1) To represent the Nationalist Government in dealings with Tibetan local government, functioning as an organization of coordination. So we participated in Tibetan local important festivals, to maintain our traditional long-standing relationship; 2) To connect with elite monks, especially to especially to win over the monasteries to create success; 3) To manage some of the Han population of Lhasa and the affairs of the small number of Han monks in the city; 4) At the same time as influencing events, to send reports on the Tibetan situation back to the Nationalist Government; 5) Maintain relations with Britain (and afterwards India), Nepal and other country's representatives and organizations in Lhasa, including handling matters dealing with visas and documents along the Indian border.
In 1944, I went with Shen Zhonglian together with a total of 14 people to Tibet, a list of whom follows: Shen Zonglian (the head of the Mongolia-Tibet Commission), Chen Xizhang (the head Secretary who became head of the office after Shen left in 1946) and his wife Zhao Keren and daughter Chen Jiwen, Zhiyi (a doctor whose surname I don't recall) and his wife Song Manchun, Li Youyi (Section Chief) and his wife (I can't recall her name; she died during childbirth not long after arrived in Lhasa), myself Liu Shengqi (English language secretary), assistant directors Li Maoyu and Li Tangyan, two cooks surnamed Qian, and Chen Changsheng (Chen Zonglian's duty stuff).
Among these 14 people, four of them were family numbers, three were assorted assistants, and Ge Chengzhi was a professional doctor, and was in charge of a medical clinic after arrived in Lhasa. Li Tangyan was an assistant manager at Central Trust Bank who intended to investigate the financial situation in Lhasa via the opportunity of coming to Tibet with Shen Zonglian. He accompanied us but was mainly preparing to set up the bank, and was going back to interior China soon, and was thus not included in the formal organization. Li Maoyu was the only staff member of the Commission, but upon his arrival he claimed that he couldn't adjust himself to the highlands climate physically, and was sent back to Chongqing after about two or three months. Therefore, the staff who remained and were actually engaged in practical work were only four: Shen Zonglian, Chen Xizhang, Li Youyi and myself.
There weren't many original staff members in Lhasa in the first place, and most of them went back to the interior of China with the former head of Commission, Kong Singsong, who held a post in the Mongolia-Tibet Committee. The only one who stayed on was the secretary for Tibetan language, named Li Guolin. There was also an interpreter called Zhang Wang, and a clerk called Mi Hui. Besides these people, there was a section chief stationed in Chengdu, named Zuo Zenji. At that moment, it took almost a month by horse from Chengdu to Lhasa. The whole communication system [of the commission] was done through telegraph. Zuo Zenji had never been to Lhasa, so I had never seen this man. The rest were assorted assistants.
This situation went on for almost a year until we had another four or five staff members arrive in succession. However, the organization of the commission was never very formal, and the division of work was not very clear neither.
Back then there was no post service between Lhasa and the interior of China; all mail was transferred from India. It took three months on a single trip to go to places like Kangding (Tib.: Dardo) and Xining. The communication was therefore mainly reliant on the telegraph bureau in Lhasa established by the Ministry of Transport. All matters, big or small, were coded in telegraphs. Code was also used to exchange telegraphs with Nationalist Government Consulate in India. Otherwise, we had to wait until someone reliable came around and entrust our mail to them, but this happened only once every several months.
I didn't plan to stay very long in Tibet. I came because I couldn't find an ideal job during the War of Resistance, and so, having been introduced by my classmate Tang Shao, went to Tibet with Shen Zonglian. My plan was to save some money and collect some materials which I could write about, in the hope of going to the United States to study journalism and ultimately change my job.
My main job was to manage the documents from Great Britain, India, and Nepal, and so on, and interpret during social occasions. It wasn't much work. But because there weren't enough staff members at the commission, I would help them out sometimes. So I began to help them translate the telegraphs. The official documents of the commission with other locations were through telegraphs, and we had them every day --some days more, and on other days less. The more important documents were given to Shen Zonglian and Chen Xizhang to deal with; I would translate those were given to me, or cooperated with Chen Xizhang to translate some occasionally. The codes that I saw and used, were common codes which had been adapted. In total, I helped to translate telegraphs like this for more than half a year.
Shen Zonglian had just arrived at Lhasa, and therefore, according to my memory, at that time almost all of the telegraphs that I had translated were words of social interaction, such as regards, congratulations, reports of safe arrivals, etc. I remember that I had seen Chiang Kai-shek, Chen Bulei, and others sending him regards about his journey, and also saw some social telegraphs (about when he would assume the post, or congratulations) from some warlord types, such as Liu Wenhui, Ma Bufang, Huang Zhengqing. Moreover, besides those to the Mongolia-Tibetan Commission, we also had contacts with ministry of foreign affairs, ministry of education, ministry of transport, ministry of Finance, and the high representative office at India dispatched by the Nationalist Government, and also consulate general.
At that time, I basically paid little attention to my translation work, as I thought it was rather a mechanical task; they wanted me to translate telegraphs, but how many times were their requests disdainful of my true talents? My help was automatic because it stemmed from a voluntary spirit. After a while, I felt bored when they asked me to translate the telegraphs. I thought, "I came to Tibet to be a secretary. They asked me to translate the telegraphs blindingly now, what else would they ask me to do in the future?" At the beginning, I told Chen Xizhang, that translation should not be part of my work. I wrote my objections down, and I showed my determination by once using illness as an excuse when they asked me to translate telegraphs again. Therefore, they never asked me to translate anymore. After the summer of 1945 when Liu Yugong, Liao Luxiang and others came, the translation work was handed over to them and Chen Xizhang.
I refused to translate telegraphs --but Shen Zonglian did not mind, which was a reason I believed he was an enlightened director.
The Lhasa Club (Ch.: Lasha lianhuanshe) was founded in the early 1946. From 1946 to the end of 1947, I was elected as the secretary-general for two years.
Around 1944, when the Japanese imperialist aggression pressured Burma, there was a batch of overseas Yunnan Chinese who came to Tibet from Burma. Most of them stuck together in the Lhasa, and they were youths. They suggested setting up a club for entertainment. A noble of Tibet, called Samdrup Podrang (who later became the Deputy Commander of the Tibetan Military Area after Liberation) agreed to construct a place for it. xviii In the end of 1945, the house was built.
In 1945, after the victory of the War of Anti-Japanese Resistance, most of those overseas Yunnan people went back to Burma to do business, and nobody cared much about the Club anymore. It was said that Samdrup Podrang complained that "You Chinese only have fiveminutes of passion to do anything! I have built the house, while you guys didn't care about it anymore, etc." When the remaining Yunnan businessmen heard those remarks, they held a conference in the commission, since everyone thought it was not good for local impressions [of Han Chinese] . Then they decided to organize the Club to regain some social credit. I had attended this conference as well. The Yunnan's businessmen, Li Heren, Ma Yicai and so on to be the directors. I was selected as the secretary-general. The secretaries I can remember were the sports secretary Xiao Chongqing and the finance secretary Yan Jun.
Part of the members in the Club were businessmen from Yunnan. The Beijing businessmen were not warm toward the Club. Others were officials. At the beginning, the number of the Club members was fifty or sixty. But since the Burma Chinese had left one by one, the number kept going down. The other Chinese weren't interested in the activities anymore and only paid the membership fee. Meanwhile, there were no Tibetans who joined us.
The funds of the Club began out of the celebration of the War of Anti-Japanese Resistance. When we won war, everyone was exciting and donated money to celebrate the victory for three days. The remaining money was used as the fees for first organizing when the Club was set up. After establishment of the Club, in order to collect funds we borrowed old films and a projector from the commission and showed a film twice, charging ticket fees to collect revenues. The funds of the Club also depended on membership fees.
In the Club, we had basketball, volleyball, a ping-pong room, a common room, a small refectory. The playground and the refectory were used more often than the others. At the beginning, because it was a fresh thing, many people came here. It was particularly attractive for Tibetans when the games started. In the end, it lost popularity.
Although the outside of the Club was built up, there was not much inside; it looked like a stadium in the interior of China. The Chinese living in Lhasa were not interested in sports, and, after a while, the attitude of people turned cold. Occasionally, the students and teachers in Lhasa would come to play basketball in there.
To support it was becoming a burden for us, but no one said we should close it. Actually, the function of the Club was: firstly, to offer a place for the commission to held the meetings. The space of the commission was narrow and small. When organizing meetings, we need to use the corridor but it was not big enough. We could use the commission's playground to hold the meetings, like the Double Ten Festival and the New Year's Day, and it was normal to celebrate on the playground. Secondly, it was convenient for primary schools in Lhasa to hold their sports classes. The pupils used the playground a lot. Thirdly, there were some people who entertained the guests in there some times, but not often. Fourthly, it could be used to organize games and have some fun once in a while. In the end of 1947, I made my mind up not to stand for secretary-general in the voting, and I never managed it after that.
Attitudes toward the Club were mixed, and the community did not speak with one voice. Shen Zonglian was supporting it. But after setting it up, he went back to the interior. He told me once, that the main opinion and collective wish was for him to organize the club, so he needed to be responsible for it. The Club could support some occasional entertainment events. If Tibetans would attend, it would be a good way to connect each other. But the slaves of Tibetan nobles got into trouble easily, and Tibetan soldiers were especially terrible and undisciplined; they always looked for trouble after drinking. Some Lamas were not easy to deal with as well. But the Club was a mass organization, with fresh things like basketball and volleyball and Tibetans were allowed to come in. If incidents occurred, the commission could not control them and would lose face. Therefore, Chen Xizhang did not endorse this kind of "extra business." Since it was already build up, the Club was left on its own to live or die.
I also remember that in 1947, there was a guy called Jiang Xinxi who stayed in one room of the Club for a few months because he couldn't find a place to live. xvi His 1953 book, co-authored with his former Nationalist colleague Shen Zonglian after only a year back from India, and in English, was Tibet and the Tibetans, an important reference work. In 1957, with Wang Jingru he published an overview of Tibetan history entitled , which was later praised as "the first work in our country [China] to use a totally new perspective" on Tibetan history. This text helped to launch into being the orthodoxy which we see in Tibetan history studies today in the PRC. xviii Here Liu potentially made an error of recollection, as it appears that Samdrup Podrang is in fact the name of the building in Lhasa which was later used as a commandary for the People's Liberation Army in the city.
